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Abstract 
Philosophy of science and mainstream epistemology have much to leam from each other. 
Most twentienth\century philosophers of science set absurdly high standards for 
knowledge, and so succumb to naive sceptical arguments. They would do well to learn 
from mainstream epistemology that reliability is a more sensible standard for knowledge 
than certainty. At the same time, mainstream epistemologists would do well to learn 
from philosophers of science that intuitions about the everyday concept of knowledge 
are unimportant, by comparison with the serious issue of how to get at the truth, My 
own view on this latter issue is that we should look to science itself for the answers, since 
science itself tells us about different techniques for uncovering the truth in different 
subject áreas. There is nothing viciously circular in this position, though it does imply 
that there is no external perspective from which science as a whole can be vindicated. 
The philosophy of science is a subject with two faces. On the one hand it 
investigates philosophical problems that arise within science, problems thrown 
up by scientific theorising itself, but which cannot be solved by empirical data 
alone. Examples of this kind of philosophy of science mclude recent work in the 
philosophy of physics, on the interpretation of quantum mechanics and the stmc-
ture of space-time theories; or, again, recent work in the philosophy of biology, 
on the logic of natural selection and the analysis of functional explanation, 
Other examples of this kind of philosophy of science are not so closely tied to 
particular scientific specialities, but grapple with notions that play a role within 
a number of different áreas of scientific theory. Under this heading comes the 
development of different mterpretations of probability, say, or the study of pro-
cesses which are asymmetrical in time. 
This face of philosophy of science, philosophy within science, we might cali it, 
has been well represented in the Department of History of Philosophy of Sci-
ence in this College, the Department which was originally part of Chelsea Col-
lege and joined King's College when the colleges merged in 1985. Both my 
predecessors as Professors and Heads of this Department, Michael Redhead 
and Heinz Post, have made important contributions in this área of philosophy of 
science, as have other past and present members of the Department. 
These contributions, and others lüíe them, can be regarded as complementing 
the work done in the rest of philosophy. Just as with other philosophical speci-
alities, lüíe the philosophy of art, say, or the philosophy of history, philosophy 
within science takes up problems that are peculiar to its own subject matter, 
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and interacts with the rest of philosophy only to the extent that it shares the 
techniques — which in the end are nothing more than argumentative care and 
patience — that are common to all philosophy. 
* * * * * 
There is, however, another face to the philosophy of science, a face whose 
relation to the mainstream of philosophical theorising is less straightforward. I 
am thinking here of the subject called scientific method, or methodology, in 
which philosophers of science study the procedures by which scientists con-
stmct and evalúate their theories, the procedures on the basis of which scien-
tists decide which theories should be admitted into the scientific canon in the 
first place. And the reason the relation of this subject to mainstream philosophy 
is not straightforward is that there is little difference between the questions, if 
not the answers, considered in this área, and those considered by non-specialist 
philosophers under the heading of epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. In 
epistemology, mainstream philosophers ask how we know about the extemal 
world, and how our beliefs about the extemal world are justified. By asking 
these questions, they are staking out the same ground as philosophers of sci-
ence who ask about the authority of our scientific theories, and about how far 
scientific beliefs are justified. 
It is tme that to some extent scientific theories have a characteristic content 
which might be thought to raise special problems of justification, Scientific theo-
ries characteristically extrapólate beyond the observational data, to make claims 
which are general, precise, and often about objects not available to the unaided 
senses. Still, while science might perhaps be distinguished from other áreas of 
discourse by the salience of such attributes as generality, precisión and 
unobservability, these are also attributes which are present in a large number of 
non-scientific beliefs, and as such are attributes which no mainstream episte-
mology worth the ñame can afford to ignore. 
So scientific method and mainstream epistemology address very much the 
same questions. However, they tend not to coordínate their answers. It is a 
striking fact, especially in this country, that practitioners of these two disciplines 
tend to proceed quite independently of each other, each developing views which 
not only take no notice of those developed by the others, but are often quite 
inconsistent with them. 
Part of what 1 want to do this evening is show how this state of affairs acts to 
the detriment of both sides. The philosophers of science would do well to listen 
more to the mainstream philosophers; and at the same time there are things the 
mainstream philosophers can leam from the philosophy of science. Perhaps 
King's College can soon play some small part in bridging this gap. Our Depart-
ment of History and Philosophy of Science will shortly be mergmg, in August, 
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with the Philosophy Department. Among the other benefits of this merger, per-
haps the combined Department wiU go some small way — or perhaps not such 
a small way, since the new combined Department will, I think, be the largest in 
this cQuntry, after Oxford — to persuading philosophers of science and main-
stream philosophers to make the effort to leam firom, and help, each other. 
* * * * * 
One does not have to look far to notice that the philosophers of science are in 
need of some help. One striking feature at work in the epistemological side of 
the philosophy of science — I'll drop this qualification "epistemological" from 
now on, since I'U be talking exclusively about this second face of philosophy of 
science in what follows — one striking feature of philosophy of science over 
the last three decades has been the currency given to extreme relativist views 
about theory-choice: views which hold that, since cholees between altemative 
scientific theories (between the partióle and wave theories of light, say, or be-
tween classical and relativistic mechanics) are never conclusively dictated by 
any finite body of experimental evidence, they must instead rest on non-rational 
groimds, on some hunch or arbitrary decisión. Perhaps the most adamant pro-
ponent of this surprising view has been Paul Feyerabend; but similar if less 
forthright relativistic sentiments have been expressed by a significant number 
of other philosophers of science, most pronünent among them, of course, being 
the T. S. Kuhn of The Stmcture of Scientific Revolutions. 
It would not of course be tme to say that this kind of relativism about theory 
choice is orthodoxy among contemporary philosophers of science. Only a mi-
nority would explicitly endorse such views. But relativism has nevertheless 
been influential beyond its numerical representation, both inside and outside 
philosophy of science. In particular, I don't think it would be inaccurate to say 
that it is currently the dominant view among historians and sociologists of sci-
ence. The historians and sociologists add an extra twist, however Philosophers 
of science like Kuhn and Feyerabend have generally had relatively little to say 
about what does determine theory- choice, if the dictates of rationality do not; 
being content to attribute such decisions more or less to fashion, or perhaps to 
the exercise of authentically free choice (this tends to be Feyerabend's line), or 
the need to find new problems to work on (as Kuhn used sometimes to sug-
gest). But the historians and sociologists have quite reasonably sought better 
ways of filling the explanatory gap, arguing that these suggestions are scarcely 
sufficient to explain the widespread agreement of large groups of scientists on 
theoretical issues, and that the real explanation must therefore lie in political 
factors, either in the form of affinities of content between certain theories and 
the interests of certain sections of society, or in the form of the outcome of 
stmggles for power between competing groups of scientists. 
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I should immediately say that withm the philosophy of science itself this kind 
of political reductionism is widely viewed with suspicion. The consensus among 
philosophers of science, I would say, is that the relativist arguments of Kuhn 
and Feyerabend are not only provocative but defirütely interesting; implausible 
perhaps, but certainly worth discussing; the historians and sociologists, on the 
other hand, have clearly gone too far; and when they start suggesting that 
scientific theorising is no more impartial an activity than political lobbying for 
economic advantage, then surely it is time to draw the line. 
However, this line tums out not to be an easy one for the philosophers of 
science to draw. For there are other strands within the philosophy of science, 
far more orthodox and widely supported than the extreme relativism of Kuhn 
and Feyerabend, which provide just as fertile a soil for political reductionism. I 
am thinking here of the falsificationism of Sir Karl Popper and his followers, 
and ofthe instmmentalism which has always been popular in the philosophy of 
science, and which has recently undergone a revival m the work of Bas van 
Fraassen and others. 
It may seem surprising that I should want to associate Popperian 
falsificationism with relativism. Surely, some of you will be thinking, Popper is 
the great defender of scientific rationality, and so diametrically opposed to the 
relativists. Let me explain. Popper of course thinks that the rejection of scien-
tific theories, their falsification, is rationally driven by evidence, as when some 
prediction issuing from a theory is experimentally disproved. But rejection is the 
easy part of scientific theorising (though not, perhaps, always as easy as Pop-
per thinks). Still, rejection is at least relatively easy, by comparison with the 
acceptance of scientific theories, in the sense of believing them to be tme. Yet 
on this question, of when we should believe theories as tme, Popper has no 
advice to offer. Indeed he goes so far as to say it is always irrational to believe 
any scientific theory to be tme, since there is no effective logic that can take 
you from the experimental evidence to any such positive scientific belief 
This is why I said that Popper provides as fertile a ground for political reduc-
tionism as the explicit relativists. For after all, despite Popper condemning it as 
irrational, scientists do normally believe as tme a wide range of general theories 
about the empirical world. So if Popper is right to hold that rational consider-
ations do not suffice to explain such beliefs, then something else must, such as, 
for instance, the political connotations of these beliefs, or the power stmggles 
among scientific groupings. 
The same point applies to the kind of instmmentalism defended by, for in-
stance, van Fraassen. Instmmentalists don't go as far as the falsificationists, in 
that they don't think that all general beliefs are irrational; just beliefs about the 
unobservable world. But even this more limitad recommendation for the sus-
pensión of belief creates space for the sociologists. For scientists do normally 
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agree in all kinds of definite positive beliefs about the stmcture ofthe unobserv-
able world. Yet, if such beliefs carmot be rationally derived from evidence, then 
they must derive from something else, like politics. 
* * * * * 
There is more to say about the inter-relations between these different strands 
in contemporary thinking about science — the explicit relativism of Kuhn and 
Feyerabend; the political reductionism of the historians and sociologists; the 
falsificatiorüsm of Popper and his followers: the instmmentalism of van Fraassen 
and others. But let me at this pomt simpliíy the issues by noting that all these 
groups are m surprising agreement on one strikmg claim. Namely, they all ac-
cept, either explicitly, or as something that follows very quickly from their as-
sumptions, that all scientific theories are very likely false. Groups of scientists 
take certain theories to be accurate reflections ofthe working ofthe world. But 
according to the philosophers of science I have mentioned, they have no ratio-
nal basis for supposmg their theories are tme, and the chances are they aren't. 
It seems to me that this attitude to science is maiñfestly absurb. It is worth 
being clear what is at issue here. The philosophers of science I have discussed 
aren't just claiming that some scientific claims are false; that the latest cosmo-
logical speculations about dark matter, say, or the claims of some cáncer re-
searcher out to catch a headlme, are false. They are saying that all scientific 
theories are likely to be false, including such theories as that water is made of 
hydrogen and oxygen, or that chickenpox is caused by a vims, or that the sun is 
powered by nuclear fusión. And this, I think, amounts to a reductio ad absurdum. 
For nobody who is sufficiently informed about these matters can seriously doubt 
the tmth of these claims. 
The absurdity of most contemporary philosophy of science is not always ún-
mediately obvious, since most of those who hold these absurd views speak with 
common sense, using terms such as scientific "knowledge" and "discovery" 
and "acceptance" to which they are not, given the normal meanings of these 
words, strictly entitled. I shall not dwell on this aspect of contemporary philoso-
phy of science, however For those who are interested, I recommend David 
Stove's little-known but extremely salutary polemic, Popper and After. 
1 say that it is absurd to deny that much scientific theorising is straightfor-
wardly tme. But let me immediately add that I am not saying that we should 
always take the deliverances of scientists at face valué, Scientists can certainly 
sometimes go wrong, and indeed one of the reasons they sometimes go wrong 
is because ofthe political implications of their views. And let me also basten to 
add that, even in cases where scientists do not go wrong, sociological and his-
torical studies of science can do much to illuminate the intemal workings of 
scientific communities, which tum out to be made up of people whose many 
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human failings often belie the conventional image of the puré and idealistic 
scientist. StiU, we can accept all this, yet refuse to adopt a general disbelief in all 
scientific fíndings, including such overwhehningly well-attested findings as that 
water is made of hydrogen and oxygen. 
Why exactly have so many contemporary philosophers of science been pre-
pared to embrace such an unacceptable position? My diagnosis is that they 
oscillate between a good argument of limited scope, and a bad argument that 
applies quite generally. 
The good argument, but with limited scope, is that there are plenty of ex-
amples of scientific theories which have tumed out to be false, and that we 
should therefore expect ftirther scientific theories to be false too. The bad ar-
gument is that, even apart from past evidence of scientific failings, we should 
never believe any scientific theory because we can never be certain that it is 
tme. 
The debate typically goes as follows. Those doubtful ofthe claims of science 
normally start with the good argument of limited scope; they point out that there 
are plenty of examples, from Ptolemaic heliocentrism to Newtonian assump-
tions about space and tune, of theories that have tumed out false. The fiiends 
of science then respond that this line of argument only stretches so far — tme, 
it shows that some generally accepted science is sometimes false; but it doesn't 
show that all is. After all, the theories just mentioned also contained a great deal 
of tme Information, alongside their false content And, what is more, such ex-
amples of false theories tend to come from certain specific áreas of science, 
such as general cosmology, or theories of space-time stmcture, and so cast 
little doubt on conclusions reached in other áreas, such as atomic chemistry or 
molecular biology. 
At this point the doubters then switch tack. They admit that there is no direct 
reason to doubt the assumptions of, say, atomic chemistry. But still, they say, 
we can't be sure, we can't be certain, of those assumptions. Maybe the evi-
dence — which originally became available at the end ofthe 18th century, in 
the form ofthe laws of combination in constant proportion by mass and volume 
— maybe that evidence made it very attractive to conclude that matter is made 
of atoms, one kind for each element, which are disposed to combine with each 
other in certain simple fixed whole number ratios. But can we be certain that 
this is the right explanation for the evidence? Maybe there is some more com-
plicated Heath-Robinsonish mechanism that just happens to genérate the same 
phenomena as the atomic hypothesis would. Or maybe there is no mechanism 
at all, but just some deity, or some demon, or some population of little green 
homunculi, who are determined, for their own reasons, to arrange the evidence 
so as to fit the laws of constant proportion. And so, since we can't be sure that 
these altematives are wrong, we aren't justified in holding that the atomic hy-
pothesis is right, Or so the doubters argüe. 
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* * * * * 
This is the point at which I think the mainstream epistemologists can help the 
philosophers of science. For of course mainstream epistemologists are extremely 
familiar with this latter form of argument. It would not be too much to say they 
are brought up on it, from the time they are introduced to Descartes' Médita-
tions in their first philosophy lecture, and are invited to grapple with the argu-
ment that since we aren't certain, that since there is room for doubt about our 
beliefs about the extemal world, we aren't justified in holding them. However, 
while the mainstream epistemologists grapple with this argument, they tend not 
to succumb to it, as in effect do the philosophers of science. For, in mainstream 
philosophy, the conclusión, say, that we don't know there's a table in front of us, 
is not regarded as an acceptable resting place, but rather as a paradox, a con-
clusión that we must find some way of avoiding. 
Orthodox analytic philosophers are often made fun of for spending so much 
time on such questions as how do we know there is a table in front of us. And 
perhaps this is right — perhaps there are more pressing questions, even within 
philosophy, than this. But in defence ofthe mainstream philosophers it can at 
least be said that they try to keep wrestling with this question until they find a 
solution. The philosophers of science, by contrast, simply give up. At bottom 
the philosophers of science I have mentioned are simply sceptics — they are 
simply succumbing, thought in a different área, to the line of argument which 
says that since we can't be certain, we shouldn't believe there is a table in front 
of US. 
One strategy by which mainstream philosophy has sought to block scepticism 
is by questioning whether certainty is not too strong a requirement for knowl-
edge. Certainty, in the sense I have been using it, is the requirement that our 
beliefs should issue from processes of thought that cannot possibly go astray, 
that is, from processes of thought that would still lead us to the tmth even under 
such extreme possibilities as that all the evidence has cunningly and precisely 
been arranged by an evil demon to make things seem other than they are. But 
this is an extremely strong demand on legitimate belief, and a significant num-
ber of mainstream philosophers think that the appropriate requirement for le-
gitimate belief is rather weaker, namely that our beliefs should issue from reli-
able processes, processes which in general do succeed in giving us tme beliefs, 
given the way the actual world works, even if they would lead us astray in a 
world which was manipulated by an evil demon. 
* * * * * 
My suggestion, then, is going to be that the philosophers of science would do 
well to follow those mainstream philosophers who seek to replace certainty by 
reliability as the appropriate requirement for knowledge. But I think there is 
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also room for some two-way traffic here: that is, I think that, on the question of 
this choice between certainty and reliability, the philosophers of science can 
also help the mainstream epistemologists. 
The preference for reliability over certainty is by no means unanimous among 
mainstream epistemologists. One reason for this is that within mainstream epis-
temology this issue is normally regarded as a question about the concept of 
knowledge: does "knowledge", as most people think of it, involve the stronger 
requirement of certainty, or only the lesser requirement of reliability? And when 
we view the issue in this way there is undoubtedly some evidence for the re-
quirement of certainty — for it is not difficult to elicit, especially from those 
with some philosophical training, intuitions in support ofthe view that any ele-
ment of uncertainty undermmes knowledge. 
Now, there is nothing wrong with the enterprise of analysing the everyday 
concept of knowledge. But it seems to me a mistake to place this enterprise of 
conceptual analysis at the centre of epistemology. This is not how Descartes or 
Hume or Kant raised the fundamental questions of epistemology. And neither, 
for that matter, is it how contemporary philosophers of science think about 
methodology. Rather than analysing the concept of knowledge, they by-pass 
issues of conceptual analysis and ask directly, like most of the great philosor 
phers of the past, what, if anything, we can do to ensure that our beliefs are 
tme, that is, what procedures, if any, will be effective in giving us tme beliefs. 
If the mainstream epistemologists were to follow the philosophers of science 
in taking this to be the central question of epistemology, rather than the analysis 
ofthe concept of knowledge, then it would become much easier for them to see 
that reliability is a more appropriate requirement for legitimate belief than cer-
tainty. Certainty would perhaps be nice, if we could get it — if only because it 
would enable us to stop worrying about manipulative demons. But, be that as it 
may, reliable processes are uncontentiously fiílly adequate if your primary aim 
is acquiring tme beliefs — for, by definition, a reliable process is one which 
generally delivers tme beliefs in this world, even if not in a demon-infested one, 
(Let me add a parenthetical point here, I think that these last considerations 
make a concept of knowledge that requires reliability rather than certainty a 
good concept of knowledge, even if it is different from the everyday one, That 
is, I think we have a reason here for replacing the everyday concept of knowl-
edge, if it does indeed cali for certainty, with a cpncept of knowledge which 
does not, This anyway is how I shall use the word knowledge in the rest of this 
lecture.) 
There is a further respect in which the mainstream epistemologists would do 
well to leam from philosophy of science, A second reason why certainty, rather 
than reliability, continúes to be upheid as a requirement for knowledge by many 
mainstream epistemologists, is that they have an altemative programme for 
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explaining how this strong demand can be met, I am thinking here of idealist, or 
verificationist, or, in Michael Dummett's terminology, anti-realist theories of 
judgement, which seek to argüe that our claims about the world do not really 
answer to features of an "extemal reality" beyond our immediate apprehen-
sion, but simply to the detectable symptoms on the basis of which we in fact 
assert such claims — detectable symptoms the presence of which we can 
arguably identify with certainty, 
This is not the occasion to debate the merits of this programme in any detall, 
But I would like briefly to observe that it quickly loses plausibility once we tum 
from the kinds of judgements that first-year philosophers cut their teeth on, to 
those that are the common currency of philosophy of science, That is, it is not 
entirely implausible, pace Dr Johnson, to hold that judgements about stones, or 
tables, or hands, are equivalent to judgements about the availability of certain 
perceptual evidence about which we can be certain, But when we tum to 
universal laws of nature, or theories about unobservable mechanisms, then it 
seems quite inescapable that the content of these claims outstrips any evidence 
of which we can be certain, and that if we are to avoid scepticism about such 
claims it must be by weakening the demand for certainty, rather than by pre-
tending they are simply claims about perceptual evidence, 
There was a time, earlier in this century, when anti-realist accounts of the 
content of unobservable claims did have some currency among philosophers of 
science, But the implausibility of this position is now generally recognized, and 
no contemporary philosophers of science still think they can block scepticism 
by anti-realist arguments. 
Tme, as I have said, most philosophers of science conclude that they can't 
block scepticism at all, and simply give in to it. But at least they recognize that 
the anti-realist option is not open. And on this specific point the mainstream 
philosophers would do well to follow suit. For, if they recognized that anti-
realism is no answer to scepticism about universal generalizations and unob-
servable claims, they would see more clearly than they do that the only viable 
anti-sceptical strategy is to weaken the requirements for knowledge. 
* * * * * 
Once we do accept reliability rather than certainty as the appropriate require-
ment for knowledge, the effect on the philosophy of science is liberating. As 
we have seen, the general argument which has persuaded contemporary phi-
losophers of science that we are not entitled to believe any scientific theories is 
that there will always be some logically possible altemative consistent with the 
evidence for theories like the atomic theory of matter, Now, this observation 
would be damning if we needed certainty, because the existence of such alter-
natives means we can't be certain the atomic theory is tme. But if all we want 
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is reliability, the existence of these altematives is in itself no argument against 
belief at all. For, provided the standard scientific practice of ignoring outland-
ishly Heath-Robinson theories, or conspiracies by evil demons, is in fact a reli-
able route to the tmth, then scientists will succeed in arriving at tme theories. 
That scientists would be led astray, in a world inhabited by evil demons, or by 
complex contrivances which produced conspiratorial evidence, is no reason 
whatsoever to conclude that they are led astray, in the actual world. 
At this point a number of you will no doubt be wanting to ask how I know that 
established methods of theory choice, methods that discount outlandish altema-
tive explanations, are in fact reliable routes to the tmth. Now, some philoso-
phers of reliabilist inclinations are inclmed to respond to this challenge by ob-
serving that we do not need to know that we know, in order to know. But I don't 
think this will do. It is of course tme that not all knowers need to know that they 
know, in order to know: as a general demand, this is clearly viciously regressive, 
and therefore self-defeating. But in the specific context at hand the request for 
some assurance that scientists do know is quite legitimate. For in the present 
context I am not just a first-order knower with views about tables or atoms or 
whatever. Rather I am a philosopher, aspiring to an answer to a specific sec-
ond-order question about knowledge — I am aspiring to establish that scientific 
knowledge is possible, and indeed actual, on the grounds that the methods that 
scientists use are reliable for tmth in this world. And given this aim, it is surely 
perfectly legitimate for you to challenge me, and ask what basis I have for my 
cmcial premiso that scientific methods are reliable for tmth. 
Still, while 1 accept this challenge, I think it is easily enough answered. The 
way we can find out that the methods used by scientists are reliable, is that 
science itself tells us so. Part of what you leam, when you become expert in 
any field of science, is which methods will be effective at answering that science's 
theoretical questions. In effect, you leam which kinds of possible answers need 
to be taken seriously as candidatos to questions in your fields, and which kinds 
of answers can be discounted; and consequently you leam what kind of experi-
mental investigation is needed to decide between the serious possible answers 
to your questions. For example, in medical science, you leam which kinds of 
agents — vimses, bacteria, parasites, nutritional deficiencies, metabolic mal-
function, environmental causes, and so on — could possibly be responsible for 
which pattems of spread of which kinds of symptoms. Because you know this, 
you know what kinds of empirical data will suffice to identify the actual causes 
of given sets of symptoms. That is, your theoretical knowledge of possible 
causes for ailments implies that certain strategies of investigation will be reli-
able routes to tme conclusions about the causes of diseases. And, of course, 
medical scientists have used just such strategies to establish the causes, and in 
some cases the preventions and cures, for a wide range of ailments, from tu-
berculosis, to smallpox, to gout. 
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This kind of story will, to many philosophically trained ears, make scientific 
discovery sound far too easy. What has happened to the well-known difíiculties 
of inductivo interpolation, to the impossibility of drawing any unique line through 
any finite set of data? However, I do not think it a demerit in the position I am 
defending that it pays little regard to these traditional difficulties. For, while 
science is often difficult, it is not that difficult. After all, scientists have estab-
lished that gout, for instance, is caused by an excess of uric acid, and that it can 
be prevented by a dmg, allopurinol, developed by the Wellcome Foundation, 
which blocks the action ofthe enzyme xanthine oxidase — a fact for which, as 
a member of a family highly prone to gout, I am extremely grateíul. And this is 
a fact, a well-established fact, and not just a bold conjecture which is no doubt 
false. If any philosophical position is to be dismissed out of hand here, it should 
not be an account, like mine, which implies that scientific knowledge is possible, 
but those positions which urge, absurdly, that such knowledge can never be 
achieved. 
* * * * * 
At this point I would like to digress briefly and say something about the relation 
between the approach 1 am defending and the recent revival of Bayesian ideas 
about scientific methodology. 1 have had in mind so far, though I haven't made 
it explicit, that reliable methods are sure-fire guides to the tmth, that reliability is 
a matter of always delivering tme beliefs. The contrast between reliabilify and 
certainty is not that reliability sometimes led us astray, whereas certainty doesn't, 
but rather that while reliable methods in fact always deliver tmths, given the 
way the actual world works, certainty demands methods couldn't but deliver 
tmths, in any crazy world whatsoever, Because of this, 1 think that if you do 
have reliable methods, you can still be fiílly confident in your beliefs, you can 
bet your life on them, even if your beliefs aren't certain in the somewhat tech-
nical sense I have been using. So reliability, as I have been using it, is still a 
pretty strong requirement. Indeed it is too strong to be a characteristic of all 
worthwhile scientific methods, What you will in fact discover, when you be-
come expert in any scientific field, is that, while some scientifíc questions can 
be answered by sure-fire principies, others will only be addressable by proce-
dures that usually give the right answers, or do so more often that not. And 
when we need to resort to such methods of of less than perfect reliability, the 
obvious corollary is that we shouldn't be fully confident of our answers, but 
should only attach a limited degree of belief to them, a degree of belief com-
mensurate with the degree of reliability of the method. 
In this respect I take the kind of reliabilist methodology I have been advocat-
ing to incorpórate the Bayesian doctrine that beliefs come in degrees with the 
stmcture of probabilities and should be treated accordingly. At the same time, 1 
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take reliabilism to provide an objective framework for Bayesianism — which is 
something Bayesianism sorely needs, since without any such objective basis 
Bayesianism faces the complaint that the degrees of beliefs it deals with, and 
its procedures for revising them, are in essence arbitrary, and that therefore it 
provides no real altemative to scepticism. 
* * * * * 
Let me retum to my main line of argument, and to some final remarks. I have 
argued that science itself can tell us that scientific methods are reliable. Some 
of you may, not without reason, detect a whiffof circularity here. I have argued 
that the practitioners of any given discipline will know that their characteristic 
methods of investigation are reliable, because their general assumptions about 
the working ofthe world imply this. But don't they need to use those methods 
of investigation in the first place, in order to acquire their general assumptions 
about the working ofthe world? 
I agree. And of course this mvolves a kind of circularity. But I don't think this 
kind of circularity is at all damning. The challenge raised some while ago was to 
provide grounds for the claún that scientific procedures of theory choice are 
reliable. This question, ofthe reliability of procedures of theoty choice, can be 
viewed as a straightforward empirical question: is it in fact the case that people 
who form beliefs in such-and-such a way will in general arrive at tme beliefs? 
And, if we do view it in this way, then what is more natural than to answer it by 
using those methods that we use to answer empúical questions in general, namely, 
observation, experiment, and existing strategies of theory choice? It is not as if 
the challenge I am facing involves any argument against these methods of 
investigation, any rationale for discarding them as a way of answering ques-
tions. So why not use them to answer this question, the question ofthe reliability 
of methods of scientific investigation? After all, how else should we answer it? 
We must be allowed to employ some means of thought if we are to have any 
chance of answering it all. And so why not use those means that are normally 
used to answer such questions, given, once more, that there are no arguments 
on the table against those means of thought? 
This use of scientific strategies of investigation to answer the question ofthe 
reliability of scientific methods obviously has its limitations. It will not do much 
to persuade thinkers who do not yet employ such methods of thought, or who 
are attached to altemative methods of thought, ofthe attractions ofthe scien-
tific approach. For, while such altemative thinkers would have a good reason 
for switching to scientific methods, if they concluded that those methods were 
a reliable source of tmth, they will not be persuaded of this conclusión, if the 
route to it depends on the prior use of scientific methods. 
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StiU, why should we regard it as a condition of satísfactorily demonstrating 
that scientific methods are reliable, that this demonstration be capable of per--
suading any conscious mtelligence whatsoever, however limited or benighted 
its mitial habits of thought? This.is, if you think about it, a great deal to ask of 
such a demonstration, and by no means an obvious consequence of the chal-
lenge raised earlier, which was simply to show, by normal standards, for all that 
was then said, that there is reason to suppose scientific methods reliable. 
I realise that our philosophical tradition normally assumes that any satisfac-
toty vindication of a claim to knowledge ought to be able to convert any con-
sciousness whatever, however limited its initial modes of thought. But I think 
we ought to stop and ask why we should hanker for such a vindication, for 
some extemal pivot by which we can lever ourselves and anybody else into an 
endorsement of normal strategies of investigation. It is, I have agreed, perfectly 
sensible to ask whether such strategies of investigation are reliable sources of 
tmth, and to seek an answer to this question. But it is not obviously sensible, and 
indeed threatens to be intellectually paralysing, to add that this answer must be 
produced in some way which does not itself utilize normal methods of thought. 
If we aren't allowed to use such normal methods, how are we to proceed? 
It is an interesting question exactly why our intellectual tradition hankers for 
some extemal standpoint from which to forcé universal assent. But this is not 
the time to pursue this question. Let me simply state my own view on this 
matter. I think that the expectation that we can find some such extemal stand-
point is a by-product ofthe assumption that knowledge requires certainty, For if 
we do assume that knowledge requires certainty, then it quickly follows that the 
legitimate sources of knowledge are highly limited, to, at best, introspection of 
our own minds and intuitively compelling steps of deductivo logic. Any more 
complex route to knowledge will be legitimate only insofar as it can be built up 
from such introspections and deductions. And so, any demonstration of the 
legitimacy of a route to knowledge will arguably be compelling to any con-
sciousness, however benighted, for it will show how this route reduces to intro-
spectivo and deductive steps, steps that are arguably inescapable for any con-
scious mind. But, as I said, all this follows only if you accept that certainty, in 
the strong technical sense, is a requirement for knowledge. This whole ratio-
nale for an extemal standpoint which will forcé universal assent falls away 
once we switch from certainty to reliability. 
The lack of an extemal standpoint that will persuade anybody to think scien-
tifically has an interesting historical corollary. A commitment to scientific meth-
ods of investigation is by no means an automatic or inevitable part of human 
nature. After all, it is only for a fairly short period of human history, the last four 
hundred years or so, and only within a fairly narrow band of societíes, that such 
methods of investigation have come to the fore. Suppose we ask, in the light of 
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this, "Why have these methods of investigation become accepted in this narrow 
portion of human history?" The natural answer, the answer many of us would 
unthinkingly give, is that in the scientific revolution the mists of superstition and 
prejudice were somehow finally swept away, and this allowed reason finally to 
discem the appropriate route to scientific tmth. But the position I have been 
defending gives the lie to this simply stoty. If there is no extemal standpoint 
from which the worth of scientific methods can be rationally demonstrated, 
then our intellectual ancestors could not have levered themselves rationally into 
scientific ways of thought. Rather, and this is of course a rather more plausible 
story anyway, given the length of time the human race had to wait, the emer-
gence of the scientific attitude must have been merely a matter of historical 
happenstance, due perhaps to the revival of Platonism and its search for simple 
underlying forms, together with the Reformation's readiness to question au-
thority and test established views against the facts. 
This happenstantial explanation implies that our intellectual forefathers in the 
scientific revolution didn't figure out how to do science by being cleverer than 
their predecessors. Rather they were just lucky that the right influences were 
available to set them on the scientific track. To some people, and in particular to 
those philosophers who place overly strong demands on knowledge, this 
happenstantial origin for science may seem to belittle its worth, to make it seem 
just one possible way of approaching the world among others. But I thmk this is 
the wrong response. Science may in this sense be just a matter of luck. But it is 
a lucky break for which we should be thankful, not ashamed. For it is a piece of 
luck that has enabled us to discover a great wealth of tmths we would other-
wise be ignorant of 
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